International Monetary Fund

APD Regional Economic Outlook (REO) provides information on recent economic developments and prospects for countries in Asia and Pacific. Data for the REO for Asia and Pacific is prepared in conjunction with the semi-annual World Economic Outlook (WEO) exercises, spring and fall. Data are consistent with the projections underlying the WEO. REO aggregate data may differ from WEO aggregates due to differences in group membership. Composite data for country groups are weighted averages of data for individual countries. Arithmetic weighted averages are used for all concepts except for inflation and broad money, for which geometric averages are used. PPP GDP weights from the WEO database are used for the aggregation of real GDP growth, real non-oil GDP growth, real per capita GDP growth, investment, national savings, broad money, claims on the nonfinancial private sector, and real and nominal effective exchange rates. Aggregates for other concepts are weighted by GDP in U.S. dollars at market exchange rates.

Global growth is forecast at 3.5 percent in 2015 and 3.8 percent in 2016, with uneven prospects across the main countries and regions of the world. The distribution of risks to near-term global growth has become more balanced relative to the October World Economic Outlook but is still tilted to the downside. The decline in oil prices could boost activity more than expected. Geopolitical tensions continue to pose threats, and risks of disruptive shifts in asset prices remain relevant. In some advanced economies, protracted low inflation or deflation also pose risks to activity. The chapter takes a region-by-region look at the recent development in the world economy and the outlook for 2015, with particular attention to notable development in countries within each region.

Global Financial Stability Report, October 2023: Financial and Climate Policies for a High-Interest-Rate Era

The Fiscal Monitor surveys and analyzes the latest public finance developments, it updates fiscal implications of the crisis and medium-term fiscal projections and assesses policies to put public finances on a sustainable footing. 

Global growth is projected at 3.1 percent in 2024 and 3.2 percent in 2025, with the 2024 forecast 0.2 percentage point higher than that in the October 2023 World Economic Outlook (WEO) on account of greater-than-expected resilience in the United States and several large emerging market and developing economies, as well as fiscal support in China. The forecast for 2024–25 is, however, below the historical (2000–19) average of 3.8 percent, with elevated central bank policy rates to fight inflation, a withdrawal of fiscal support amid high debt weighing on economic activity, and low underlying productivity growth. Inflation is falling faster than expected in most regions, in the midst of unwinding supply-side issues and restrictive monetary policy. Global headline inflation is expected to fall to 5.8 percent in 2024 and to 4.4 percent in 2025, with the 2025 forecast revised down.

The risks to global growth are broadly balanced and a soft landing is a possibilityGlobal growth is projected at 3.1 percent in 2024 and 3.2 percent in 2025, with the 2024 forecast 0.2 percentage point higher than that in the October 2023 World Economic Outlook (WEO) on account of greater-than-expected resilience in the United States and several large emerging market and developing economies, as well as fiscal support in China. The forecast for 2024–25 is, however, below the historical (2000–19) average of 3.8 percent, with elevated central bank policy rates to fight inflation, a withdrawal of fiscal support amid high debt weighing on economic activity, and low underlying productivity growth. Inflation is falling faster than expected in most regions, in the midst of unwinding supply-side issues and restrictive monetary policy. Global headline inflation is expected to fall to 5.8 percent in 2024 and to 4.4 percent in 2025, with the 2025 forecast revised down. With disinflation and steady growth, the likelihood of a hard landing has receded, and risks to global growth are broadly balanced. On the upside, faster disinflation could lead to further easing of financial conditions. Looser fiscal policy than necessary and than assumed in the projections could imply temporarily higher growth, but at the risk of a more costly adjustment later on. Stronger structural reform momentum could bolster productivity with positive cross-border spillovers. On the downside, new commodity price spikes from geopolitical shocks––including continued attacks in the Red Sea––and supply disruptions or more persistent underlying inflation could prolong tight monetary conditions. Deepening property sector woes in China or, elsewhere, a disruptive turn to tax hikes and spending cuts could also cause growth disappointments. Policymakers’ near-term challenge is to successfully manage the final descent of inflation to target, calibrating monetary policy in response to underlying inflation dynamics and—where wage and price pressures are clearly dissipating—adjusting to a less restrictive stance. At the same time, in many cases, with inflation declining and economies better able to absorb effects of fiscal tightening, a renewed focus on fiscal consolidation to rebuild budgetary capacity to deal with future shocks, raise revenue for new spending priorities, and curb the rise of public debt is needed. Targeted and carefully sequenced structural reforms would reinforce productivity growth and debt sustainability and accelerate convergence toward higher income levels. More efficient multilateral coordination is needed for, among other things, debt resolution, to avoid debt distress and create space for necessary investments, as well as to mitigate the effects of climate change.